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WOULD YOU GO TO WORK IF YOU WEREN’T 
PAID? THE PROBLEM OF INCENTIVES  
FOR PARTICIPANTS IN STANDARDS  
DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
Consumer telephone hardware choices are plentiful, from handsets to 
headsets, but all have at least this much in common: no matter which 
telephone you choose to buy, it will connect to the public telephone 
system using a standard RJ-11 plug.1 This is because many products, 
whether as ordinary as telephones or as extraordinary as nuclear reactors, 
are standardized for safety, for quality, and for interoperability.2 
Standards-setting affects almost everything about us: our homes, our 
offices, even the air we breathe.3 All of this occurs out of sight for the 
 1. The RJ-11 (Registered Jack-11) is the most common telephone plug. It was originally 
invented by AT&T and is now widely used. For more on the process by which the FCC adopts 
technical standards, see 47 C.F.R. § 68.7 (2005) (adopting technical criteria published by the 
Administrative Council for Terminal Attachments) and ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL FOR TERMINAL 
ATTACHMENTS, OPERATING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (2003), http://www.part68.org/ 
Documents/ACTA_OPP_REV_1.6.pdf. 
 2. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF 
STANDARDS SETTING 6–12 (2004) [hereinafter ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING]. The 
variety of existing standards, relating to products from the utterly commonplace to the highly 
extraordinary, is impressive in its own right. See id. Among the mundane, one organization has 
adopted a standard for library shelving. See National Information Standards Organization, Z39.73—
Single-Tier Steel Bracket Library Shelving, http://www.niso.org/standards/standard_detail.cfm? 
std_id=491 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). In stark contrast stand those standards governing the 
construction of nuclear power plants. See, e.g., IEEE Standards Association, IEEE Revises Nuclear 
Power Standard for Class 1E Cables, Starts Revision for Power Supply Standard, 
http://standards.ieee.org/announcements/pr_690rev.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter IEEE]. 
Dividing these countless and diverse standards into rigid categories such as safety, quality, or 
interoperability standards captures little of the complex role standards play. The ABA Antitrust 
Section divides standards into five categories: quality standards (“define acceptable product 
characteristics related to attributes such as performance, safety, or efficiency”), informational 
standards (“sets parameters for the type of information conveyed about the product”), uniformity 
standards (“minimizes proliferation of product categories and attempts to achieve the optimum variety 
of a particular product”), interoperability standards (“assure that two related products or processes will 
fit and/or operate with one another”), and professional conduct and certification standards (“protect the 
public from professionals who are in a position to take unfair advantage of the consumer’s situation”). 
ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra, at 6–12. 
 3. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 14 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial 
decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf. Some air quality 
standards are determined, at least in part, through the standards development organization (SDO) 
process. For example, the California Air Resources Board (CARB), a department of the California 
Environmental Protection Agency, was established in 1967 to “protect the health, welfare, and 
ecological resources of California through the effective and efficient reduction of air pollutants.” Id. In 
the late 1980s, in accordance with its mandate to reduce air pollutants, CARB was directed to adopt 
“new standards for automobile fuels and low emission vehicles.” Id. at 15. For more on CARB and its 
air quality standards-development activities, see discussion infra Parts II.A–B. 
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average consumer, yet we all have a stake in the standards ultimately 
chosen.4 We want the best airbag performance standards,5 the safest 
nuclear power plants,6 the cleanest air,7 and we want all of this at the 
lowest price.8
The number of active technical standards in existence today is 
staggering.9 Many of these, including plumbing codes10 and electrical 
codes,11 are developed by standards development organizations (SDOs).12 
The standards these organizations create assure us that our houses, when 
properly built under the relevant codes, will not burn down because the 
electrician used non-standard wiring13 or fall down because the engineer 
employed non-standard load calculations.14 Standards-setting can make 
 4. See Donald J. LeCraw, Some Economic Effects of Standards, 16 APPLIED ECON. 507, 507 
(1984) (“Although standards pervade the economic, political, social and technological life of modern 
man, they have been largely ignored by the general public.”). See also International Organization for 
Standardization, Overview of the ISO system, http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/ 
index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (describing the “invisible” contribution to “most aspects of our 
lives”). For more on the International Organization for Standardization, see infra note 37. 
 5. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. §§ 552, 571, 585, 595 (2005) (containing recent updates to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) airbag safety performance standards). Unlike 
many standards-setting organizations, the NHTSA is a governmental agency. 
 6. See, e.g., IEEE, supra note 2. 
 7. See supra note 3. 
 8. See LeCraw, supra note 4, at 514 (Standards “may confer economic benefits and may impose 
economic costs on the economy.”). In the last two decades, the FTC has been increasingly guided by 
consumer welfare in its antitrust enforcement decisions. Indeed, “the promotion of consumer welfare 
has become the sole guiding principle of the antitrust laws. Consumer welfare has in turn been equated 
with economic efficiency.” DAVID A. BALTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST: GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST, 15 (2004) (citations omitted). See also PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 100a (2d ed. 2000) (The “principal objective of 
antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively . . .”). 
 9. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 4. In 1995, there were more than 
93,500 active standards, not including those imposed at the state, county and local levels. Id. Of these, 
some 52,000 were imposed by the federal government and the remainder were promulgated by private 
standards-development organizations. Id. Almost three-quarters of the federally imposed standards 
originated with the Department of Defense. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PLUMBING AND MECHANICAL OFFICIALS, 
UNIFORM PLUMBING CODE (2003). 
 11. See, e.g., PAUL ROSENBERG, AUDEL GUIDE TO THE 2002 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CODE 
(2004) (discussing National Fire Protection Association’s 2002 National Electric Code). 
 12. Codes like the National Electric Code, supra note 11, are very often developed by private 
SDOs and adopted into law by local governments. See Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head, 486 
U.S. 492, 495 (1988) (“A substantial number of state and local governments routlinely adopt [NFPA’s 
National Electric Code] into law with little or no change . . .”). As such, petitioning before the SDO 
itself during the development process is not immunized under Noerr-Pennington. Id. at 509–10. For an 
explanation of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and its implications in this context, see infra Part I.B.  
 13. See ROSENBERG, supra note 11, at 258–85 (delineating the types of materials permitted by 
the National Electric Code in a variety of wiring applications). 
 14. See BUILDING OFFICIALS AND CODE ADMINISTRATORS INTERNATIONAL, BOCA NATIONAL 
BUILDING CODE (1999). Much like NFPA’s National Fire Code, discussed supra note 12, the BOCA 
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being a consumer easier and, in many respects, safer.15 The process by 
which such standards are developed in the United States is unique in that it 
is largely and increasingly conducted by private organizations, not 
governmental agencies.16 Despite an increasing trend toward private-
sector standards development, the government continues to retain a 
significant stake in the standards ultimately adopted.17 Senator Leahy, co-
sponsor of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 
2004, explained: “[r]ather than Government overregulation of technical 
standards, SDOs promulgate guidelines that frequently are then adopted 
by State and Federal governments.”18 Much like consumers, the 
government may derive considerable benefit from the adoption of 
standardized technology.19
This Note examines SDOs through the lens of the most recent 
developments in Congress and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).20 
code is adopted by state and local governments. See, e.g., City of St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 60664 
(Feb. 17, 1998) (adopting the BOCA National Building Code as the building code for the City of St. 
Louis, Missouri). 
 15. See Patrick D. Curran, Comment, Standard-Setting Organizations: Patents, Price Fixing, and 
Per Se Legality, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 983, 987 (2003). Reduced choice may in some circumstances be 
beneficial to consumers. Id. For example, if Xerox fax machines used one technology and Canon fax 
machines another, consumers would clearly have a choice between the two platforms. Id. If they were 
made interoperable, consumer choice would be decreased. Consumer welfare, however, would 
increase. See id. Futhermore, incompatible products with similar functions are wasteful. Id. Rather 
than building on a base of established technology, firms are forced to “reinvent the wheel.” Id. at 988–
89.  
 16. Daniel C. Schwartz & Frank M. Gorman, Shield for Standards: The New Law to Boost 
Standard-Setting Groups, but Does it Really Help?, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 2004, at 27. Although 
there are many remaining governmental standards, see supra note 9, “it has been federal policy since 
at least the Reagan administration . . . to require the use of voluntary consensus standards to the extent 
possible in all procurement and regulatory activities.” Id. (citing testimony of James Shannon). 
 17. See supra note 12, describing the frequent government adoption of privately developed 
standards. 
 18. 110 CONG. REC. S3,614 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy). Congress, in its 
findings on the passage of the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004 (“the 
SDOAA”), found that “[h]aving the same technical standards used by Federal agencies and by the 
private sector permits the Government to avoid the cost of developing duplicative Government 
standards and to more readily use products and components designed for the commercial marketplace, 
thereby enhancing quality and safety and reducing costs.” SDOAA § 102(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 4301 
(2004). For more on the SDOAA, see infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Peter K. Ashton, Some Economic Effects of Standards—Comment, 19 APPLIED ECON. 
1515, 1517 (1987) (finding benefits including “reduction in product differentiation, lowering of 
consumer search costs, and decreased production costs through achievement of economies of scale”); 
Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and Trade and Professional Association Standards and 
Certification, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 471, 471 (1994) (noting the benefit to consumers of reduced 
product differentiation and of professional certification standards). 
 20. Congress passed the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act in 2004. The 
SDOAA significantly altered the potential antitrust liability of private SDOs. 15 U.S.C.A. § 4303 
(2004). For a more detailed look at this and other provisions of the SDOAA, see infra notes 45–47 and 
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First, in Part I, it discusses the form and function of the typical private-
sector SDO and illustrates the various types of standards that such 
organizations develop.21 Drawing on the underlying policies behind our 
patent system and the nuts and bolts of our antitrust laws, it highlights the 
dangers to competition and the significant potential disincentives for 
innovation that the adoption of standards carries with it.22 Part II, 
employing the tools laid out in the previous section, illustrates what I call 
the “problem of incentives.”23 To this end, the FTC’s recent Union Oil Co. 
of California (Unocal)24 decision and its pending Rambus25 action are 
discussed in some detail. Part III of this Note explores a possible 
alternative to the too-frequent use of private SDOs. This alternative 
suggests that the use of SDOs in industries that do not require standards-
setting (those characterized by strong network effects) should be 
eliminated through firm application of the antitrust laws.26 Where a 
standard will likely be reached without consensus standards development, 
forbearance is a better solution. Outside of such contexts, however, and 
particularly in the realm of safety standards, the great utility of the SDO 
concept is measured in lives saved;27 forbearance could scarcely be 
accompanying text. The FTC has brought several antitrust actions relating to SDO and SDO 
participant behavior as well. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) 
(initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf, rev’d Union Oil 
Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the Commission), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf. For a discussion of Unocal, see infra Parts II.A–B. 
See also Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. For a discussion of Rambus, see infra Part II.C. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
 22. See infra Parts I.B and I.C.  
 23. See infra Part I.C.2 and Part II. The “problem of incentives” is a term that I have used to 
describe an undesirable result from the interaction of patent law and antitrust law in the SDO context. 
Many commentators have dealt with other aspects of the necessary balance between often 
contradictory fundamental premises in these fields. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Afterword: The Role of 
the Competition Community in the Patent Law Discourse, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 841 (2002); Louis 
Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984); Richard D. 
Chaves Mosier and Steven W. Ritcheson, In re Cardizem and Valley Drug: A View From the Faultline 
Between Patent and Antitrust in Pharmaceutical Settlements, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH 
TECH. L. J. 497, 510 (2004); Suzzette Rodriguez Hurley, Note, Failing to Balance Patent Rights and 
Antitrust Concerns: The Federal Circuit’s Holding in In re Independent Service Organizations 
Antitrust Litigation, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 475 (2004). 
 24. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf, rev’d Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket 
No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/ 
040706commissionopinion.pdf. 
 25. Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
 27. See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, A PROFILE OF FIRE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4 (12th ed. 1998) (“fires resulted in 4,035 civilian deaths and 23,100 injuries”), available at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/5
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considered an alternative. The “problem of incentives” remains, but the 
potential human costs that may attend a failure to adopt adequate safety 
standards leads to a potential compromise: legislatures could depute 
already extant SDOs to do the heavy lifting of standards development.28 
While there would arguably be an economic price tag on doing so, such 
action may lend SDOs the quasi-legislative status required to make the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine29 applicable to lobbyists before them. The 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine provides certain immunities from the antitrust 
laws for actions taken by competitors to seek advantage through 
legislative processes.30 Allowing open competition would certainly 
increase the investigative burden placed upon the quasi-legislative SDO in 
determining a “best” standard, but it offers the prospect of an economic 
incentive for innovation. Finally, in Part IV, this Note briefly revisits 
Unocal and Rambus, concluding with a discussion of the obstacles that lie 
in the path to a system, similar to the one here suggested, in which 
innovation is properly rewarded. 
I. THE STANDARD DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION 
A. Standards-setting and the role of SDOs 
It comes as no surprise to any of us that lumber stores, whether in 
Maine or Mississippi, carry plywood that is eight feet by four feet in a 
number of uniform thicknesses, or that a bolt purchased at a hardware 
store in Tacoma matches precisely a nut purchased at another in Topeka.31 
The size of lumber and the thread alignment on a bolt are each governed 
by a standard:32 “a set of characteristics or quantities that describes 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-214.pdf. The trend, however, is toward 
decreased numbers of fires and fire injuries. Id. at 3. 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
 29. For a fuller explanation of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine and its applicability in this 
context, see infra Part II.B. 
 30. See infra notes 52–64 and accompanying text. 
 31. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 1. 
 32. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers publishes many national standards for 
different types of screw threads. See, e.g., 2003 Unified Inch Screw Threads, UN and UNR Thread 
Form, http://catalog.asme.org/Codes/PrintBook/B11_2003_Unified_Inch_Screw.cfm (last visited Feb. 
5, 2005) (specifying “the thread form, series, class, allowance, tolerance, and designation for unified 
screw threads”). Lumber grading standards are set by the National Hardwood Lumber Association. 
AMERICAN HARDWOOD EXPORT COUNCIL, THE ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO AMERICAN HARDWOOD 
LUMBER GRADES, http://www.natlhardwood.org/illustrated_guide/IllustratedGradingGuide.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
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features of a product, process, service, interface, or material.”33
The United States does not have a single administrative body 
responsible for determining the thread design on a bolt or the size of a 
sheet of plywood.34 Instead, numerous groups, both public and private, 
create industry standards.35 Private standards development organizations 
often either fall under the umbrella of a larger standards organization (such 
as the American National Standards Institute36 or the International 
Standards Organization37), or are themselves small industry consortia 
formed for the purpose of setting standards in a highly dynamic industry.38 
In any event, SDO members collaborating to create a particular standard 
are very often “industry participants;”39 that is, they are competitors who 
are highly interested in the product of the SDO’s effort.40 The private 
SDO, which by its nature sits competitors in an industry across the table 
 33. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 1 (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (1995)).  
 34. Cf., e.g., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 891, STANDARDS SETTING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
16 (1997), available at http://ts.nist.gov/ts/htdocs/210/gsig/staneu.pdf (describing the European 
Union’s old approach to standards setting as having relied upon the national standards development 
bodies of member states to inform the EU Commission of proposed draft standards or amendments to 
facilitate coordination). The EU’s “New Approach to Technical Harmonization” is more closely akin 
to the U.S.’s reliance upon private standards development organizations. See id. at 18.  
 35. See supra note 9. 
 36. See ANSI, About ANSI Overview, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx? 
menuid=1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (“The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private, 
non-profit organization (501(c)3) that administers and coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization 
and conformity assessment system.”). 
 37. See International Organization for Standardization, Overview of the ISO system, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) (“ISO is a 
network of the national standards institutes of 156 countries, on the basis of one member per country, 
with a Central Secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland, that coordinates the system.”).  
 38. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 5. One such group is the Joint 
Electron Device Engineering Council (“JEDEC”), an SDO active in the setting of computer memory 
chip standards. See Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 93–105 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. The organization has since changed its 
name to the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association. See JEDEC.org, About JEDEC, http://www. 
jedec.org/Home/about_jedec.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2005). 
 39. See ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 23. 
 40. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 21–22 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial 
decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf. Where a standard 
overlaps with an existing patent, the patent-holder may earn substantial profit from licensing fees. Id. 
at 22 (“Were Unocal to receive a 5.75 cents per gallon royalty on all gallons of ‘summertime’ CARB 
RFG produced annually for the California market, this would result in an estimated annual cost of 
more than $500 million.”). See also generally Michael G. Cowie & Joseph P. Lavelle, Patents 
Covering Industry Standards: The Risks to Enforceability Due to Conduct Before Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 30 AMER. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N. Q. J. 95 (2002) (offering a general review of the 
relevant legal issues for patent holders, SDOs, and SDO participants in the standard-setting context). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/5
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from one another to discuss the direction that the industry as a whole 
should take, should ring alarm bells in any antitrust student’s head.41
B. Antitrust Law Applied to the SDO Construct 
SDOs have come under increased scrutiny in recent years, both by the 
FTC and by Congress. Despite a number of antitrust actions in the courts 
relating to alleged misconduct involving SDOs and their participants’ 
behavior,42 Congress has embraced the SDO concept for the recognized 
benefits of adopted standards.43 Both Congress and the FTC have sought 
to increase consensus standards-development while recognizing the 
potential for abuse that attends any such collaboration among 
competitors.44 Congress, through passage of the Standards Development 
Organization Advancement Act (SDOAA), sought to protect SDOs from 
frivolous litigation that would discourage these typically non-profit 
organizations from engaging in the standards-setting process.45 
Underlying this desire to protect SDOs from unnecessary inclusion in 
antitrust suits was a desire to “encourage the development and 
promulgation of voluntary consensus standards.”46 The SDOAA, however, 
is aimed at the standards development organizations themselves and not at 
SDO participants.47
 41. See generally Peter Grindley et al., Standards Wars: The Use of Standard Setting as a Means 
of Facilitating Cartels, 3 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 1 (1999).  
 42. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/ os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf, rev’d, Union Oil Co. of Cal., 
Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ 
d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf; Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial 
decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. 
 43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 4301 (2004). In its findings associated with the SDOAA, Congress, among 
other things, “recognized the importance of technical standards developed by voluntary consensus 
standards bodies to our national economy.” Id.; see also supra note 18. For a discussion of the benefits 
of consensus standard adoption, see generally Cowie & Lavelle, supra note 40; Douglas D. Leeds, 
Raising the Standard: Antitrust Scrutiny of Standard-Setting Consortia in High Technology Industries, 
7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 641 (1997). 
 44. Ashton, supra note 19, at 1517 (noting the risk that standard adoption may “help protect the 
market position of existing producers); Michael Goldenberg, Standards, Public Welfare Defenses, and 
the Antitrust Laws, 42 BUS. LAW. 629, 631 (1987) (discussing similar anticompetitive consequences to 
standards development); Grindley et al., supra note 41, at 1; LeCraw, supra note 4, at 519 (concluding, 
among other things, that the high usage of standards in concentrated industries may stem from the 
“desire of the firms . . . to use product standards to entrench, extend and exploit their market power”). 
 45. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–05 
(2004). 
 46. See H.R. 1086, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted). 
 47. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301–05 (2004). In its findings, Congress noted that “[p]rivate 
developers of the technical standards that are used as Government standards are . . . vulnerable to 
being named as codefendants in lawsuits even though the likelihood of their being held liable is remote 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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SDO participants’ actions may, in appropriate circumstances, implicate 
sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act,48 among other competition laws,49 
depending in large part upon who is setting the standard. Section 2 liability 
may arise, for example, in the case of a unilaterally set standard, such as 
the emergence of the Windows operating system’s dominance in the PC 
market.50 Either section 1 or section 2 liability may arise in the context of 
consensus standards-setting, with its constant threat of collusive or 
exclusive behavior by and among competitors.51
Participants may be immune from these provisions under the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine in certain circumstances if the standards development 
organization is itself a legislative body.52 The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
in most cases, and they generally have limited resources to defend themselves in such lawsuits.” Id. 
§ 4301. The Act provides a number of protections in return for fairly minimal filing requirements. In 
particular, the Act requires that an SDO file a written notification of “(A) the name and principal place 
of business of the standards development organization, and (B) documents showing the nature and 
scope of such activity.” Id. § 4305(a)(2). In addition, in order to obtain the protections of the Act, an 
SDO is required to file updates as this information changes. Id. § 4305(2). In return for this fairly 
minimal filing, the Act provides a rule of reason standard of review for all alleged violations by an 
SDO. Id. § 4302 (conduct “shall not be deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the 
basis of its reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition, including, but 
not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, relevant research, development, product, 
process, and service markets”). The Act allows only actual, rather than treble, damages, in actions 
against SDOs, and preempts state antitrust laws in this respect. Id. § 4303(a). Arguably the Act’s most 
important provision for discouraging the unnecessary inclusion of SDOs in antitrust litigation is the 
institution of a loser-pays rule. SDOs may recover their costs, including attorneys fees, “if the claim, 
or the claimant’s conduct during the litigation of the claim, was frivolous, unreasonable, without 
foundation, or in bad faith.” Id. § 4304(a)(2). These provisions, taken together, are intended to 
discourage the naming of an SDO in an antitrust action for damages.  
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade . . . is declared to be illegal . . .”); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize . . . 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . .”). 
 49. The broad language of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s section 5, for example, may 
encompass a wide variety of offenses. See FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000) (“Unfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”). 
 50. See ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 6, 15. 
 51. See id. at 15. For example, an organization of professionals cannot institute ethics standards 
that require competition only on the basis of non-price qualities, even if ostensibly it is in the public’s 
interest that they do so. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695–96 (1978). 
The rules the Society adopted ostensibly regarded competitive bidding as a threat to building quality, 
and thus “contrary to the public interest.” Id. at 685. “[T]he Society’s Board of Ethical Review has 
uniformly interpreted the ‘ethical rules against competitive bidding for engineering services as 
prohibiting the submission of any form of price information to a prospective customer which would 
enable that customer to make a price comparison on engineering services.’” Id. at 683. The Court 
viewed this elimination of competitive bidding as no more than an elimination of competition itself, 
and therefore found a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 695–96. 
 52. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (explaining the three bases for the doctrine as 
articulated in Noerr). The basis for the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is, at best, muddled. Confusion as 
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permits competitors to seek advantages through “legislation, adjudication, 
or executive and administrative machinery” by attempting to influence 
governmental proceedings.53 The Doctrine rests upon the Supreme Court 
decision in Noerr Motor Freight.54 The Court there articulated three 
separate bases for its decision.55 The Court found that regulation of 
political activity was not the purpose of the Sherman Act;56 that 
representative democracy requires participation by constituents;57 and, 
lastly, that the Act should be read to avoid implicating First Amendment 
questions.58 Accordingly, the Court found no liability under the Sherman 
to what basis the Doctrine rests upon has led, in turn, to confusion in the courts as to both how to apply 
the Doctrine and the extent of its protections. In particular, the “sham” or “misrepresentation” 
exception to the Doctrine has proved difficult to define or, for that matter, control. See infra note 62 
for an explanation of the sham exception. In Unocal, the Commission ultimately found no Noerr-
Pennington immunity because of this exception. See infra Part II.B. See also Union Oil Co. of Cal., 
Docket No. 9305, 17 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ 
d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf (listing numerous Courts of Appeal that have found “that in 
some contexts misrepresentations to government may vitiate Noerr-Pennington protection”). This 
view, while well-supported, is not universally held. 
 53. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 146. 
 54. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The rise of 
the trucking industry in competition with railroads after World War II caused the railroads to recognize 
“the struggle as one of economic life or death for their method of transportation.” Id. at 128–29. The 
railroads’ presidents organized the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference, which in turn launched a 
publicity campaign to tarnish the public image of the trucking industry and encourage legislation 
detrimental to the trucking industry. Id. at 129. Although the lower courts found the campaign to be a 
violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the Supreme Court reversed. See Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. 
v. E. R.R. Presidents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. E. 
R.R. Presidents Conference, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959); Noerr, 365 U.S. 127. The Court found no 
Sherman Act liability for the Conference on the theory that 
[a] construction of the [Act] that would disqualify people from taking a public position on 
matters in which they are financially interested would thus deprive the government of a 
valuable source of information and, at the same time, deprive the people of their right to 
petition in the very instances in which that right may be of the most importance to them. 
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139. 
 55. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH NO. 19, THE NOERR-PENNINGTON 
DOCTRINE 9–11 (1993). 
 56. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140–41 (“Insofar as that Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that 
condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and . . . a publicity campaign to influence 
governmental action falls clearly into the category of political activity.”). 
 57. Id. at 137. The Court stated: 
In a representative democracy. . .[the political branches] of government act on behalf of the 
people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation depends upon the 
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the 
government retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at the same 
time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of their wishes would impute to the 
Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a purpose 
which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act. 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 138 (“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, and 
we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms.”). 
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Act for the defendant’s “‘vicious, corrupt and fraudulent’”59 campaign to 
discredit a competitor, “at least insofar as those activities comprised mere 
solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and 
enforcement of laws.”60 In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the case 
that provided the second half of the Doctrine’s name, the Court applied 
Noerr immunity to attempts to influence public officials acting not as rule-
makers, but as purchasers.61 Noerr immunity also applies outside of the 
legislative process, but is somewhat more limited.62 For example, although 
Noerr teaches that “unethical political conduct in the legislative context is 
irrelevant for antitrust purposes,”63 such conduct is not condoned in an 
adjudicatory process.64
 59. Id. at 129. 
 60. Id. at 138. 
 61. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Pennington, a 
number of large coal companies, facing overcapacity, had entered an agreement with the unions to 
raise minimum wage, thereby driving smaller, less mechanized mines out of business. Id. at 660. The 
higher production costs associated with these higher wages were to be demanded by workers in mines 
across the industry, irrespective of the mine’s ability to pay. Id. The Sherman Act § 1 charges related 
to the successful effort by large coal companies and labor unions to have the Secretary of Labor raise 
the minimum wage requirement for mine workers of firms selling coal to the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. Id. at 659–60. In what is now a too-broad reading of Noerr, Justice White wrote that Noerr 
“shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or 
purpose.” Id. at 670. Pennington also offered the important alternate holding that the Sherman Act 
damages were unavailable to the plaintiff under Noerr because the injury suffered was caused by the 
Secretary of Labor. Id. at 671. 
 62. The filing of lawsuits, for example, is immune from antitrust prosecution unless the lawsuits 
are “objectively baseless.” Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 60 
(1993) (The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment as it reasonably found that 
the defendant’s lawsuits were an “objectively plausible effort” to enforce its rights.). Id. at 65. 
Professional Real Estate Investors illustrates what is referred to as the “sham exception” to the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine. Id. at 60. This exception withholds immunity from conduct that uses the 
adjudicatory process, as opposed to the result, to harm a competitor. Id. at 60–61. The Court regards as 
sham “‘private action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,’” as 
opposed to actions that are “‘a valid effort to influence government action[].” Id. at 58 (quoting Allied 
Tube & Conduit v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4 (1988)). In Professional Real Estate 
Investors, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals finding of probable cause for the 
underlying lawsuit, thereby taking the litigation out of the sham exception and placing it squarely 
inside of Noerr. Id. at 65–66.  
 63. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, at 167 (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 64. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513 (“Misrepresentations . . .are not immunized when used 
in the adjudicatory process.”). The primary distinction between the legislative process and the 
adjudicatory process is legistures’ greater ability to root out falsehoods. Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky 
Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 690 F.2d 1240, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit, relying upon 
Cal. Motor Transp., noted that  
the adjudicatory sphere is much different from the political sphere. There is an emphasis on 
debate in the political sphere, which could accommodate false statements and reveal their 
falsity. In the adjudicatory sphere, however, information supplied by the parties is relied on as 
accurate for decision making and dispute resolving. The supplying of fraudulent information 
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C. Background of the “Problem of Incentives”: Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Using the SDO Model 
In passing the SDOAA, Congress neglected the motivating force 
behind SDOs: the participants who bring their innovations and know-how 
to the table.65 SDOs themselves are not innovators; rather, they are 
synthesizers of already-extant information.66 Were SDO participants 
wholly to reject the standards-setting process because it carries little 
benefit for them, SDOs would be unable to function.67 This “Chicken 
Little” scenario is unlikely to occur; the huge number of existing standards 
reflects their popularity among manufacturers who realize some cost 
savings by utilizing the standards-setting process.68 This cost savings, 
passed on to consumers, lends support for retaining some industry 
standards.69 The advantages, however, may be overstated. Countervailing 
arguments include the risks of premature standard-selection and what I call 
the “problem of incentives.” 
thus threatens the fair and impartial functioning of these agencies and does not deserve 
immunity from the antitrust laws.  
Id. The Commission likewise relied upon Cal. Motor Transp. in finding that Unocal’s 
misrepresentations before CARB were not immunized under Noerr-Pennington because CARB relied 
upon information provided to it by participants. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 36–37 
(F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706 
commissionopinion.pdf. 
 65. See discussion supra note 47. For an interesting discussion of another threat to SDO member 
participation, see Curran, supra note 15, at 994–1001. The author argues for the adoption of a rule of 
“per se legality for single-source patent price bargaining” to alleviate the risk of non-participation by 
would-be members who fear price-fixing liability. Id. at 1001. 
 66. See, e.g., International Organization for Standardization, Overview of the ISO System, 
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). The 
International Organization for Standardization, one of the largest standards-setting bodies in the world, 
describes its process as “[m]arket-driven.” Id. Industries ask for standardization and the ISO, in turn, 
borrows experts from numerous industry groups, brings them together, and causes them to work out a 
consensus standard. Id. Thus the ISO, acting as facilitator, brings no industry-specific expertise to the 
standards development process. 
 67. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Private SDOs rely upon participants to bring their 
knowledge to the table. Id. 
 68. Curran, supra note 15, at 986. 
 69. See generally Cowie & Lavelle, supra note 40; Leeds, supra note 43. In its findings relating 
to the passage of the SDOAA, Congress noted that standards development “enhanc[es] quality and 
safety and reduc[es] costs.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 4301 (2004). For a discussion of other economic effects 
beneficial to manufacturers, see Ashton, supra note 19, at 1515 (“Standards influence economic 
behaviour in such ways as reducing costs through the achievement of economies of scale, reduction in 
transactions costs, and improving the flow of information.”). 
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1. Premature Standard Selection 
The dangers that attend premature standard selection are the same 
dangers that attend any “incorrect” decision under the theory of path 
dependence.70 The theory posits that a standard chosen too early would 
preclude potentially superior technologies before they have had an 
opportunity to develop.71 If the costs associated with later “switching 
paths” are greater than the difference in benefit realized between the two 
paths, the market will not switch to the superior technology.72 
Demonstrably superior products may never show up in the marketplace. 
Oft-cited examples are the VHS/Beta battle in which VHS, a technology 
some have viewed as inferior to Beta, won,73 and the lock-in of the 
 70. A leading theorist uses the simple example of a sudden introduction of automobiles to an 
island. W. BRIAN ARTHUR, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Small Events, in INCREASING RETURNS AND PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 13, 14 (1994). 
Drivers may choose to drive on the left side of the road or the right side of the road. “[A]s a higher 
proportion of drivers chooses one side, the payoff to choosing that side rapidly rises.” Id. at 14. 
Ultimately, the cost of changing sides (that is, a head-on collision) will be too great and the “path” will 
have been determined. Id. Everyone will drive on the same side. The more complicated issue involves 
the unknown and small events that, though unpredictable beforehand, may ultimately determine the 
outcome: “drivers’ reactions, dogs running into the road, the timing or positioning of traffic lights.” Id. 
Along these lines, many commentators have argued that we have been left with the wrong kinds of 
products in the marketplace, such as the QWERTY keyboard, because of what amounts to historical 
accident. David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes: A Response to Professor Schlunk, 80 
TEX. L. REV. 893, 899–900 (2002) (describing one explanation of why the inefficient QWERTY 
design remains dominant today). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 
J. L. & ECON. 1 (1990) (criticizing the path dependence argument as applied to the development of the 
QWERTY keyboard). The most common such story is that of the VHS format’s triumph over Beta. 
Bradley H. Weidenhammer, Capatability and Interconnection Pricing in the Ariline Industry: A 
Proposal for Reform, 114 YALE L.J. 405, 411 n.22 (2004). For more on path dependence, see Joseph 
Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatability, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 
(1985).  
 71. See id. 
 72. The simple path dependence example provided in note 70 assumes that neither the left side of 
the road nor the right side of the road is a “better” choice. See ARTHUR, supra note 70, at 14. However, 
what if it were true that right-side drivers, as a group, arrive at their destinations 5% more slowly than 
left-side drivers? Were this scenario to play out naturally, more drivers would realize the advantage to 
driving on the left and, because of the increasing return, left-side driving would become the standard. 
It would become “locked-in.” Id. But what if, because of “drivers’ reactions, dogs running into the 
road, the timing or positioning of traffic lights,” events that may be termed historical accidents, right-
side driving were “chosen” instead? This is, or should be, a concern about standards adoption in those 
industries characterized by network effects. While interoperability provides significant benefit to 
consumers, the preclusion of potentially superior technologies is a serious risk when choosing a 
standard. See supra note 15. 
 73. See Carole E. Handler & Julian Brew, The Application of Antitrust Rules to Standards in the 
Information Industries—Anomaly or Necessity?, 14 COMPUTER LAW 1, 3 n.11 (1997); Stan J. 
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: 
THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 981, 993 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & 
Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000). 
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QWERTY keyboard.74 The premature selection of the inferior technology 
or process creates initial conditions that preclude later adoption of superior 
technology.75 The same may hold true for standards.76
2. Introducing the Problem of Incentives  
Neither Congress nor the FTC has examined the problem of standards-
setting from the perspective of the would-be SDO participants.77 Indeed, a 
significant cost associated with the standards-development process, what I 
call “the problem of incentives,” has not been placed into the balance by 
commentators or courts.78 The problem may be stated simply: profit-
seekers must be provided incentives for their efforts.79 Corporations are, 
 74. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AMER. ECON. REV. 332, 332–36 
(1985); see also Liebowitz & Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, supra note 70. 
 75. See ARTHUR, supra note 70, at 14. 
 76. See id. at 26 (citing Farrell & Saloner, supra note 70). The author argues that “early adopters 
are affected by the choices of later adopters,” which may compel a choice based upon “expectations of 
what is likely to prevail, even if founded on very little . . .” Id. 
 77. Commentators, however, have indirectly addressed the problem. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, 
Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002) 
(discussing the problems that may arise where holder of a patent covering the consensual standard 
refuses to license). 
 78. See discussion of Unocal and Rambus, infra Parts II.A–C. Courts typically look to “whether 
the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety 
of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 
3, 10 (1997). See also James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and 
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 251 (1995) (The approach to standards-setting 
“activities under the rule of reason is to inquire whether the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive 
effects and, if so, whether the [activity] is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that 
outweigh those anticompetitive effects.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This analysis could 
encompass the most troubling aspect of Unocal and Rambus, the disincentive to innovation, but has 
not yet done so. 
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Article I of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” Id. Although the 
Founders clearly believed that an intellectual property protection system would promote innovation, 
other claimed justifications for U.S. intellectual property laws are numerous and varied. For example, 
rationales for patent protection include: 
1. “Invention Motivation”: patent protection allows appropriability and internalizes 
externalities 
2. “Invention Dissemination”: patent protection encourages wider disclosure and use of 
inventions 
3. “Invention Commercialization”: patent protection induces development and 
commercialization of non-commercial inventions 
4. “Orderly Cumulative Development of Inventions”: patent protection assures orderly 
development of inventions which are cumulative 
Robert Stoner, Presentation at the FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law 
and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy: Intellectual Property and Innovation 2 (Feb. 26, 2002), 
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generally speaking, not vehicles for beneficence.80 Research and 
development costs vary, but in many industries are extraordinarily high.81 
Research is undertaken, however, because the market rewards innovation 
with the possibility of monopoly profit.82 The United States does this by 
offering patent owners a government-sanctioned, limited-term right to 
exclude others from producing or selling a patented technology.83 This 
assures the holder of a valuable patent significant profit during this limited 
term.84 In return for this assurance, the technology becomes publicly 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020226robertdstoner.pdf. Most prevalent, however, is the 
innovation-promotion notion that we see in the Constitution. The FTC, for example, notes that patent 
rights allow firms “to increase their expected profits from investments in research and development, 
thus fostering innovation that would not occur but for the prospect of a patent.” FEDERAL TRADE 
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY 2 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/0223/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC 
Innovation Report]. 
 80. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”). For a more modern defense of 
the shareholder wealth maximization norm, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means 
and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574–92 (2003). 
 81. See Why Drugs Cost So Much, medicineNet.Com, www.medicinenet.com/script/main/ 
art.asp?articlekey=18892 (last visited May 15, 2006). Pharmaceutical companies have famously high 
research and development costs.  
Much expense is incurred in the early phases of development of compounds that will not 
become approved drugs. In addition, it takes about 7 to 10 years and an average cost of 500 
million dollars to develope each new drug. The money is spent before the FDA approves the 
drug, and if the drug is not approved, the company loses the money. 
Id. Although a per drug estimate is difficult to verify, the overall expenditures for research and 
development at large pharmaceutical companies are unquestionably large. For example, according to 
its 2003 10-K, drug maker Merck/Schering-Plough Pharmaceuticals spent $2.46 billion in 2001, $2.68 
billion in 2002, and $3.12 billion in 2003 on R&D. MERCK & CO., INC., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
STOCKHOLDERS 21 (2003), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/64978/ 
000095012304003093/y94774exv13.htm. Eli Lilly, another large drug maker, reported similarly large 
costs of $2.2 billion in 2001, $2.15 billion in 2002, and $2.35 billion in 2003. ELI LILLY & CO., 
ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS 6 (2003), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
59478/000095013704001857/c83409exv13.htm. 
 82. Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 268–69 
(2003) (“[I]nnovation . . . is how firms earn the monopoly profits that reward their investments and 
innovations in lowering costs and raising quality.”). 
 83. A patent is “a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).  
 84. See Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 
FED. CIR. B. J. 5 (2004–2005). Note that there is a distinction between a patent and what is commonly 
referred to as a monopoly. “Ask the average man whether ‘monopoly’ is bad and he will undoubtedly 
tell you it is. Ask him why and he will say that monopolies gouge the public. To talk of the ‘patent 
monopoly’ weds patents to prejudice, which is not conducive to clear thinking.” Id. at 8. Indeed, both 
the legal kind conferred by a grant of patent and the illegal kind that the word may conjure up for 
Rich’s “average man” both fit neatly into the definition of “monopoly”: “[t]he market condition 
existing when only one economic entity produces a particular product or provides a particular service.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (8th ed. 2004).  
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available after the term expires and may be produced by others without 
penalty.85 The monopoly profits and licensing fees that can be realized 
during the limited-term right to exclude are a very strong incentive 
towards innovation and invention.86 Consumers tolerate the 
anticompetitive effects of excluding everyone but the patent-holder 
because the consumer may ultimately benefit from new technology.87
II. THE PROBLEM OF INCENTIVES: WHAT’S A FIRM TO DO?  
A. Unocal: Initial Decision 
The recent Unocal decision by the FTC illustrates how the standards-
development process places these rewards at risk.88 In its first iteration, 
Unocal came before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Michael Chappell 
on motions to dismiss,89 most notably for present purposes on the basis of 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.90  
The allegations arose from Unocal’s participation in setting a 
California standard for the manufacture of Reformulated Gasoline 
(RFG).91 The California Air Resources Board (CARB), a department of 
the California Environmental Protection Agency, was charged with 
 There are clear distinctions, of course, between a monopoly and the rights conferred by a patent to 
exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell an invention. One is that a patent only 
excludes others from employing “a certain solution, though not all solutions to a given problem.” 
DONALD S. CHISUM, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 57 (3d ed., 2004). Additionally, a monopoly, unlike 
a patent, implies the possession of market power. Indeed, the “average patent . . . confers too little 
monopoly power on the patentee in meaningful economic sense. . .and sometimes it confers no 
monopoly power at all.” WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374–75 (2003). However, neither distinction is relevant here. In the 
SDO context, the adopted technology, if covered by an existing patent, generally will confer monopoly 
power to the patent-holder. Other solutions, if any exist, are typically excluded by the adoption of the 
standard. 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). A patent is valid for twenty years. Id. At the expiration of this 
term, the patent-holder loses its right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. 
See id.  
 86. See FTC Innovation Report, supra note 79, at 2. 
 87. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966) (“The basic quid pro quo contemplated by 
the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public 
from an invention with substantial utility.”). 
 88. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf, rev’d Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket 
No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the Commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ 
d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf. 
 89. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 1–2 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf. 
 90. Id. at 1. The market power question addressed in Unocal is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 91. Id. at 2–3. 
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determining “cost-effective regulations and standards governing the 
composition of low emissions” RFG.92 Unocal recognized that an overlap 
between its own patents and the new CARB regulations could be highly 
advantageous.93 Unocal had a pending patent application relating to its 
5/14 Project, which involved a formula for calculating emissions levels in 
gasoline based upon its chemical composition.94 Seeking to profit from a 
potential overlap between its patent and the standard for RFG, Unocal did 
not disclose the patent application in its communications with CARB.95 
Rather, in a letter to CARB, Unocal stated: “Please be advised that Unocal 
now considers this data to be nonproprietary and available to CARB, 
environmental interests, groups, and members of the petroleum industry, 
and the general public upon request.”96
CARB used Unocal’s data from the 5/14 Project to set certain RFG 
specifications.97 Ultimately, five of Unocal’s eight variables from its 
equations were incorporated into CARB’s model; of these, the T50 
variable was exclusively introduced by Unocal.98 The Patent and 
Trademark Office accepted Unocal’s 5/14 Project patent application in 
July 1992.99 After California refiners “invested billions of dollars in sunk 
capital investments” to make the CARB standard RFG, Unocal undertook 
efforts to enforce its patents.100 The FTC alleged that Unocal would reap 
$500 million in licensing fees from its actions.101
In the initial decision, Administrative Law Judge Chappell held, inter 
alia, that CARB’s standards development activities were quasi-legislative 
in nature.102 As such, because “[c]ase law interpreting Noerr-Pennington 
 92. Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. Id. at 16. 
 94. Id. at 14. Unocal’s scientists had discovered the “directional relationships between eight fuel 
properties—RVP, T10, T50, T90, olefin content, aromatic content, paraffin content, and octane—and 
three types of tailpipe emissions—i.e., incompletely burned or unburned hydrocarbons, carbon 
monoxide, and nitrogen oxides.” Id. Using the level of these eight fuel properties in a particular batch 
of gasoline, the formula would calculate the level and type of emissions that would be produced. This 
would have fulfilled the “cost-effective” mandate under which CARB was working. See id. at 15. 
 95. Id. at 15.  
 96. Id. at 17.  
 97. See id. In particular, CARB used the equations to set its T50 specification. Id. 
 98. See id. at 17–18. 
 99. Id. at 21. 
 100. Id. at 22. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Whether CARB was a quasi-legislative (as opposed to quasi-adjudicatory) body determined, 
under the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, whether Unocal’s activities were immune from antitrust 
prosecution. Id. at 32. “‘[U]nethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process often results in 
sanctions’ and . . . ‘misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used 
in the adjudicatory process.’” Id. (quoting Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
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allows deliberate deception in a legislative proceeding where the agency is 
not solely dependent on the petitioner for information,” Unocal’s actions 
fell within the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.103 Unocal’s conduct thus was 
“political petitioning behavior[]”104 immune from antitrust liability.105
B. Unocal: Opinion of the Commission 
The Commission, on appeal from the ALJ’s dismissal of the case 
against Unocal on Noerr-Pennington grounds,106 flatly rejected the 
application of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to the CARB-Unocal 
relationship.107 Having first dismissed the Supreme Court’s Noerr 
jurisprudence as “unsettled,”108 the Commission found the majority of 
circuits hold that “in some contexts misrepresentations to government may 
vitiate Noerr-Pennington protection.”109 Citing California Motor 
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited,110 Allied Tube & Conduit v. Indian 
Head,111 and Walker Process Equipment v. Food Machinery & 
Chemical,112 along with a number of lower court decisions, the 
Commission concluded that “the fabric of existing law is rich enough to 
extend antitrust coverage, in appropriate circumstances, to anticompetitive 
conduct flowing from deliberate misrepresentations that undermine the 
legitimacy of government proceedings.”113
This much is not revolutionary.114 However, the Commission, focusing 
upon the Supreme Court’s statement that the “applicability of Noerr-
Pennington varies with the context and nature of the activity,”115 rejected 
508 U.S. 49, 61 n.6 (1993)). For a discussion of the Doctrine’s varying applicability under the current 
law depending upon the nature of the proceeding, see supra Part I.B. 
 103. Id. at 47 (finding that Unocal’s conduct “did constitute political petitioning behavior[,]” 
which is immune under Noerr-Pennington from antitrust liability). 
 104. Id. at 56. 
 105. See infra Part I.B. 
 106. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. Nov. 25, 2003) (initial decision), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/ d9305/031125aljsinitialdecision.pdf. 
 107. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the 
commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf. 
 108. Id. at 16. 
 109. Id. at 17. 
 110. Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).  
 111. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
 112. Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chemical, 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
 113. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 30 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the 
commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf. 
 114. Numerous Courts of Appeal have found a misrepresentation exception to the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine. See id. at 16–17 (compiling cases).  
 115. Id. at 30 (citing Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499). 
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the Unocal initial decision’s reading of the misrepresentation exception as 
limited to adjudicatory proceedings.116 Instead, the Commission employed 
a four-factor test to the FTC’s allegations to determine the nature and 
context of the proceeding.117 First, the Commission concluded that CARB, 
although a rule-making arm of the California EPA, had an expectation of 
honesty from participants.118 It was forced to rely upon the participants’ 
factual assertions.119 CARB’s mandate to institute “maximum feasible 
reductions” in pollutants and “the most cost-effective combination of 
control measures”120 was found to limit its discretion in standards 
setting.121 Citing these three factors, the Commission held that the policy 
concerns underlying Noerr were not implicated by refusing its application 
to Unocal’s conduct.122 The Commission thus formulated a new test for 
application of Noerr to bodies not purely legislative.123 Unocal, in its 
conduct before CARB, may well have failed that test. 
The ultimate outcome is an unhappy one for Unocal. Through this 
broad reading of the sham or misrepresentation exception to Noerr-
Pennington, the company may be offered nothing for its trouble in 
developing its T50 technology.124 CARB, by its own admission, would 
have written the standard to avoid overlap with Unocal’s T50 patent if it 
had known of the patent’s existence.125 Yet, in failing to fully disclose the 
existence of the patent and its intent to prosecute it, Unocal now faces 
disgorgement of the profits it obtained and, potentially, treble damages.126 
This award could reach many millions or even billions of dollars.127  
 116. Id. at 31. 
 117. See id. at 32–35. These are: (1) whether the body had an expectation of truthful 
representation; (2) the degree of discretion the body possessed in its decision-making capacity; (3) the 
extent of the body’s need to rely upon participants’ factual assertions; and (4) the post-hoc ability of a 
tribunal to determine whether a given misrepresentation actually caused the decision in question. Id. 
 118. Id. at 37–39.  
 119. Id. at 41–42. 
 120. Id. at 39 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 121. Id. at 39–41. 
 122. Id. at 43–45. 
 123. Id. at 55. 
 124. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 125. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 7 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the 
commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf (“Had Unocal 
disclosed its proprietary interests and pending patent rights earlier, CARB would have been able to 
consider the potential costs imposed by the Unocal patents . . .”). 
 126. The FTC decision was a reinstatement of the antitrust action against Unocal, originally 
dismissed by the ALJ on Noerr-Pennington immunity grounds. See id. at 54. Any remedy is still some 
time away. However, common remedies include disgorgement or an award of treble damages. A 
decision finding Unocal liable for an antitrust violation would likely see its current licensees, those oil 
refiners that installed billions of dollars in capital investments in their refineries, filing additional 
actions against Unocal for damages. For example, in Rambus, discussed infra Part II.C, the FTC 
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C. Rambus 
In Rambus,128 the Administrative Law Judge examined conduct very 
similar to that of Unocal, with the exception that Noerr-Pennington’s 
applicability was never in contention.129 Rambus, as a participant in the 
private consensus SDO Joint Electron Device Engineering Council 
(“JEDEC”), did not disclose its ownership of certain patents covering the 
dynamic random access memory (DRAM) standard ultimately adopted by 
the SDO.130 In his holding, Administrative Law Judge Stephen J. McGuire 
found that Rambus had no duty under JEDEC rules to disclose its 
intellectual property holdings,131 and that no other viable alternative to the 
Rambus technology existed at the time that the SDRAM standard was 
adopted.132 Thus, Rambus was saved for the present133 by sloppy internal 
rulemaking at the JEDEC and by its own superior product.134 Although it 
is unclear from the Initial Decision whether the JEDEC would have 
adopted Rambus’s patented technology had it been aware of the patents,135 
brought antitrust charges against the company relating to its participation in JEDEC, but there was a 
long period of private litigation relating to the enforcement of Rambus patents. See Rambus, Inc. v. 
Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 874 (2003). 
 127. See supra note 40 for an estimate of Unocal’s profits. 
 128. Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. 
 129. Where no “official authority has been conferred upon it by any government, and the 
decisionmaking body of the [SDO] is composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives 
to restrain trade,” the SDO cannot be treated as quasi-legislative for purposes of Noerr-Pennington 
immunity. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988). Likewise, the 
JEDEC was composed of industry actors and had no authority conferred upon it from any government. 
Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 37–39 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. After Allied Tube, it is quite clear that misrepresentations to 
private SDOs are not immunized under Noerr. 
 130. Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 2 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. DRAM is “dynamic random access memory,” 
typically used in computer-related products like printers, PDAs, and cameras. Id. at 8. 
 131. Id. at 260 (“JEDEC merely encouraged the disclosure of intellectual property and any duties 
Respondent may have had towards other JEDEC members were so unclear and ambiguous that they 
cannot form the basis for finding liability in this case.”). 
 132. See id. at 332. 
 133. Rambus is on appeal to the full Commission, but at the time of the writing of this Note no 
decision had been reached. See Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial 
decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm. 
 134. Sloppy internal rulemaking, particularly with respect to patent-disclosure policies, may be a 
response to potential liability. See Curran, supra note 15, at 991–92. A tightening of loose patent-
disclosure policies in the post-Rambus environment, however, is very likely. See Nicos Tsilas, Toward 
Greater Clarity and Consistency in Patent Disclosure Policies in a Post-Rambus World, 17 HARV. J. L 
& TECH. 475 (2004). 
 135. Even if alternatives had existed, JEDEC would not have rejected the Rambus technology. See 
Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 319–22 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf. Cf. Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 7 (F.T.C. July 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p211 Kriegel book pages.doc9/6/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
it seems clear that disclosure would likely have threatened Rambus’s 
potential profits from its patented technology.136  
D. Unocal and Rambus Illustrate a Systemic Problem 
Rambus and Unocal together illustrate the problem of incentives. Our 
patent system rewards innovation by allowing a firm awarded a patent to 
exclude others from using the patented process or technology.137 The 
patent holder, either through licensing or directly employing its patent, 
may realize substantial economic gain.138 Indeed, much of our economic 
law is intended to encourage innovation and risk-taking.139 Leaving aside 
for the moment the arguably unethical conduct of Unocal, the standards 
development process for reformulated gasoline in California was destined 
to preclude the company or any other similarly situated firm from 
obtaining significant profit from its research.140 Given the tightening of 
SDO patent-disclosure rules that will inevitably take place post-
Rambus,141 the disincentives for innovation will be at least as great in the 
private SDO context.142
7, 2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commission 
opinion.pdf (“Had Unocal disclosed its proprietary interests and pending patent rights earlier, CARB 
would have been able to consider the potential costs imposed by the Unocal patents.”).  
 136. Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302, 205 (F.T.C. Feb. 23, 2004) (initial decision), http://www. 
ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/040223initialdecision.pdf (“Even Assuming That Alternatives Did Exist, 
JEDEC Would Not Have Rejected the Rambus Technologies.”). However, the ALJ then went on to 
describe the possibilities that stood before JEDEC if disclosure had been made. Id. at 319. Had 
Rambus disclosed its patents and refused to give an assurance before adoption that it would not 
enforce the patents, “if there were no ex ante negotiations, JEDEC could have . . . adopted different 
standards.” Id.  
 137. See supra note 79. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat’l Fin. Corp., 675 F.Supp. 238, 257 & n.22 (M.D. Pa. 
1987) (citing Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund, 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982)) (“One objective of the 
business judgment rule is . . . to encourage others to assume entrepreneurial and risk-taking activities 
by protecting them against personal liability when they have performed in good faith and with due 
care, however unfortunate the consequence.”). Likewise, the encouragement of innovation and 
invention are built into the U.S. Constitution itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, supra note 79. See also 
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002) (granting patent-holders a twenty year right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the patented invention); FTC Innovation Report, supra note 79. This 
effectively acts to reward the risk of research and investment expenditures. 
 140. See generally Part I.C.2 for a discussion of how incentives spur innovation. Removing such 
incentives invites decreased research and development investment. 
 141. See Tsilas, supra note 134 at 521 (“SDOs need to reexamine their patent policies, particularly 
focusing on their key patent disclosure provisions.”). 
 142. There will remain some SDOs associated with government that, under the Commission’s 
“context and nature” test, will offer Noerr immunity to participants. See supra Part II.B. Noerr does 
not apply to private SDOs, however, and those like JEDEC will be permitted to require absolute 
honesty and forthrightness by participants on pain of antitrust scrutiny. See supra note 29. 
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III. RESTORING THE BALANCE BETWEEN INNOVATION AND REWARD 
A. If the Characteristics of the Relevant Industry Permit, Forbear 
The use of SDOs in industries characterized by strong network 
effects143 should be eliminated through strict application of the antitrust 
laws.144 Where strong network effects exist in a particular industry, the 
market is likely to ultimately select a “best” standard.145 While simply 
disbanding SDOs in these industries is not a perfect solution, other means 
exist to duplicate many of the benefits of standards-setting.146
For example, failure to adopt a non-safety standard may lead to a 
decreased level of interoperability.147 Interoperability, however, can be 
fostered instead by the concept of an open source code.148 While this 
means one thing in the context of, for example, the Linux operating 
system for Intel-compatible PCs,149 the “open source code” concept may 
 143. Industries characterized by strong network effects (that is, increasing returns) are more likely 
to reach a standard on their own. See Curran, supra note 15, at 986; see also supra Part I.C. 
 144. This paper does not, of course, recommend selective enforcement of the antitrust laws by the 
FTC. Rather, standards development should be folded into the legislative process only in those 
industries where standards development is necessary. See infra Part III.B. Where adoption of a 
standard will occur on its own (e.g., the increasing returns scenario), the SDO should not be deputed 
by the relevant legislature and will therefore not be immunized. 
 145. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 146. See discussion, supra note 15, of how standards make being a consumer easier and safer. The 
economic advantage conferred to manufacturers is also significant. See ABA HANDBOOK ON 
STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that “imperfect interoperability between software 
and hardware systems used by various members of the U.S. automotive supply chain results in costs of 
at least one billion dollars per year”) (citations omitted). Hardware/software interoperability standards 
are, however, numerous. See Jack E. Brown, Technology Joint Ventures to Set Standards or Define 
Interfaces, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 921 (1993). If merely “imperfect” interoperability standards cause $1 
billion in losses to one (albeit large) industry, interoperability standards generally create significant 
cost advantages.  
 147. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 10. Interoperability is one of the 
great benefits of uniform standards. Such standards “allow interchangeability of complementary 
products.” Id. See also Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatability: Innovation, 
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940 (1986). 
 148. RICHARD RAYSMAN, PETER BROWN, & JEFFREY D. NEUBURGER, EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: 
FORMS & ANALYSIS § 3.18. In their treatise on emerging technologies, the authors describe the open 
source approach like this: “[o]pen source software is software, the source code form of which is made 
available by its owner to the public under a ‘public license,’ so that the source code can be read, 
modified and redistributed by users, subject to certain conditions.” Id. The solution here envisioned 
would have manufacturers publish, if they seek the efficiencies of interoperability, the technical 
information required for others to integrate their own technologies with that of the manufacturer. 
While this would require, in many cases, licensing fees, the publication of interoperability 
specifications would not be obligatory.  
 149. Id. § 3.18. Sun Microsystem’s Linux operating system is “perhaps the most well-known open 
source product.” Id. For a more complete description of the development and current state of the Linux 
open source code operating system, see Linux.org, What is Linux, http://www.linux.org/lininfo/ 
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mean something else in different industries.150 In addition, in some 
industries there is the possibility that standards will be chosen 
unilaterally.151 Unilateral standard-selection manifests in industries 
marked by strong network effects.152 Many technology industries are 
marked by network effects of varying strength, and in these industries it is 
generally unnecessary to do any standards development work to obtain 
interoperability.153
B. Where Forbearance is Unacceptable, Make SDOs Quasi-Legislative 
Of course, allowing things to sort themselves out without the benefit of 
a formal standard-setting process would prove unreasonable in some 
industries. The clearest case for retaining the standards-setting machinery 
is in the safety standard context. Unfortunately, few safety standards will 
be characterized by strong network effects.154 Thus, the development of 
particular safety technologies often will not carry sufficient economic 
incentives to cause one particular technology to become a unilateral 
standard.155 But these standards are extremely important: if 
interoperability or informational standards carry repercussions measured 
in dollars,156 failed safety standards are measured in human lives.157 The 
participation of market actors in the standards-development process is 
highly desirable.158 One of the primary advantages of allowing non-
governmental SDOs to set standards is their participants’ expertise; no 
index.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). 
 150. For example, a company owning a patent in a particular connection between computer and 
peripheral may value interoperability over potential licensing fees. It might then offer a public license 
for the use of this technology. This would permit standardization but leave unharmed the incentives for 
innovators. 
 151. ABA HANDBOOK ON STANDARDS SETTING, supra note 2, at 6. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Further, it may be dangerous to do so. See supra notes 70, 72. The standards-setting process 
itself may be akin to Arthur’s “drivers’ reactions, dogs running into the road, the timing or positioning 
of traffic lights,” those external events that may cause premature selection of an “inferior” standard. 
See ARTHUR, supra note 70, at 14.  
 154. But see discussion, infra note 176, on the difficulty of separating safety from non-safety 
standards. While individual automobile airbags, for example, do not become more useful when more 
people purchase cars equipped with them, many technologies less directly related to safety may be 
thought of as such. Id.  
 155. See supra note 27. 
 156. See discussion of the value of interoperability standards to consumers and manufacturers, 
supra note 146. 
 157. See supra note 70. 
 158. See supra note 16.  
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existing government body has both the technical know-how and the 
resources to effectively decide between competing technologies.159  
Although standards-setting is a necessity in some industries and is best 
done by expert private market actors, allowing private SDOs to set 
standards endangers the participation of these very actors in the process.160 
SDO participants are asked to leave their own self-interest at the door and 
cooperate to determine the “best” standard.161 While, on the one hand, the 
current body of law provides enormous economic incentives for 
participants to act in their own self-interest,162 it then penalizes them for 
doing so.163 This is wrong-headed. Firms like Unocal should realize profit 
when they have developed a useful process that will, for example, produce 
clean gasoline in the most inexpensive way.164  
Rather than permitting private SDOs to continue to dampen innovation 
by would-be participants, legislative bodies should depute already extant 
SDOs (that is, provide SDOs with rulemaking authority).165 As quasi-
legislative rulemaking agencies, these SDOs should then be provided 
sufficient resources to do their work166 and complete immunity from 
antitrust prosecution.167 While the resources issue is always a concern for 
SDOs, more important may be their newly acquired, unquestionable quasi-
legislative status.168
Misrepresentations made while petitioning before a quasi-legislative 
body are, as discussed above, immunized from antitrust liability under the 
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.169 Cases like Unocal would never be brought 
 159. William L. Monts, Note, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.: An Emerging 
Conceptual Framework for Claims of Noerr Immunity?, 41 S.C. L. REV. 633, 654 (1990) (noting that 
legislators lack the expertise necessary to determine the proper provisions in the National Electric 
Code). 
 160. See supra Part II.D. 
 161. See discussion, for example, of CARB’s reliance upon participants’ factual assertions, supra 
Part II.B.  
 162. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 163. See supra Parts II.A–B.  
 164. See supra note 94. 
 165. This proposal would merely cut out one step in the process: adoption in whole of the relevant 
standard by the legislature. See discussion supra note 12.  
 166. See infra note 172 for a discussion of the additional investigatory burdens that would fall 
upon the SDO if this system were adopted.  
 167. The SDOAA does not, at present, provide complete immunity to the SDOs themselves. See 
supra note 47.  
 168. See supra note 64 for a discussion of how quasi-legislative status would affect the application 
of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine to private standards-development organizations. 
 169. Misrepresentation before legislative bodies, discussed infra note 173, is to be distinguished 
from misrepresentation made before adjudicatory bodies. Even misrepresentation to an administrative 
agency has been found too far from the legislative, political arena to justify immunity. See Israel v. 
Baxter Labratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“No actions which impair the fair and 
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because, under this system, Unocal would have been immune from 
antitrust prosecution even though it was found to have made material 
misrepresentations with respect to the existence of its T50 patent.170 
Admittedly, it seems counter-intuitive to condone immunization for 
deceptive behavior.171 It is possible that the T50 standard was not the 
“best” standard for reformulated gasoline.172 However, the potential harm 
that can occur in such a situation relates to the conflict between the covert 
competitive behavior of the market participant and the expectation of 
honesty and forthrightness by the SDO. CARB, unlike the deputy-
legislature it would become under this proposal, expected honesty and fair 
dealing by participants.173 If SDOs were deputized as quasi-legislative 
agencies of state or federal government, the possibility of substantial profit 
would again be embraced.174  
impartial functioning of an administrative agency should be able to hide behind the cloak of an 
antitrust exemption.”). This perhaps reflects, more than anything else, a certain unease about giving 
deception a judicial stamp of approval, particularly when the harm done to another party is significant. 
 170. This much is made clear by Unocal. See Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9302, 54, (July 7, 
2004) (opinion of the commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commission 
opinion.pdf (vacating dismissal of the Initial Decision because “[t]he Noerr-Pennington claims cannot 
be sustained if the Complaint’s allegations are taken as established”). 
 171. Immunity under Noerr-Pennington clearly extends into the realm of misrepresentations made 
in the political arena. Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); see supra 
note 102. Allied Tube may have limited the Court’s holding in California Motor Transport. In that 
case, the Court held that antitrust liability may exist for “misrepresentations made under oath at a 
legislative committee hearing in the hopes of spurring legislative action.” Allied Tube & Conduit v. 
Indian Head, 486 U.S. 492, 504 (1988).  
 172. In Unocal, CARB likely adopted the best standard (with respect to air quality, as opposed to 
cost-effectiveness). Union Oil Co. of Cal., Docket No. 9305, 77 (F.T.C. July 7, 2004) (opinion of the 
commission), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/040706commissionopinion.pdf. Indeed, based upon 
the non-cost information that it had, CARB incorporated Unocal’s T50 component into its formulae. 
See supra notes 94, 97. The standard might be viewed as inferior from a cost perspective; CARB did 
not have at hand the relevant information as to the potential licensing fees that would be required of 
refiners because it was under the impression that Unocal would not enforce its patent rights. See supra 
note 96 and accompanying text. However, it takes little creativity to imagine a situation in which 
deceit might compel an SDO to adopt a standard that is less safe. This is a very real danger of the 
Noerr-immunized SDO. It would be all the more troublesome because, if the SDO were a quasi-
legislative body acting under the auspices of the relevant legislature, the SDO itself would almost 
certainly be immune from damages. Presumably, this danger could be largely ameliorated by thorough 
“legislative” inquiry by the SDO, undertaken with the full understanding that participants likely have a 
strong profit motive to having a particular standard adopted. 
 173. California’s Attorney General accused Unocal “of seeking to ‘hijack and distort’ the state 
regulatory process.” Mueller, supra note 77, at 627.  
 174. See supra note 79. Even quasi-legislative SDOs may be unable to protect the profit-for-
innovation exchange with would-be participants in some circumstances. See infra Part IV. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A number of obstacles lie in the path to reinstituting the incentive-
based system for innovation that has long existed in this country.175 One 
such obstacle is deciding which SDOs to retain as quasi-legislative bodies 
and which to dispose of as unnecessary.176 Another potential problem is 
the level of inquiry that would become necessary for relevant bodies to 
undertake in a Noerr-immunized SDO world.177 There would almost 
certainly be economic costs involved.178 And, perhaps most importantly, 
there is no assurance that this system would produce results any more 
equitable, on balance, for parties interested in the standard chosen.179
The recent increased scrutiny of SDOs is well justified by the 
enormous potential for abuse they carry.180 This increased scrutiny has 
unfortunately led policy-makers in the potentially hazardous direction of 
endorsing discrete, relatively small central-planning authorities that decide 
upon what factors competitors across entire industries will compete.181 
This, in turn, has put in jeopardy the incentive system that drives much 
beneficial innovation.182 The SDO problem should be recognized as just 
 175. Indeed, incentives to encourage innovation have existed at least since the Constitutional 
Convention. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 176. This problem is directly related to the difficulty of separating safety standards from non-
safety standards. For an example illustrating this difficulty, see Mueller, supra note 77, at 633 n.48 
(citing Malcome W. Browne, Refining the Art of Measurement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at D1–D6) 
(The incompatibility of Baltimore’s fire hydrants and the fire hose connectors of other cities during a 
1904 fire meant that fire departments called in to help battle the blaze had to sit by idly while 1,500 
structures burned.). Are fire hose connectors merely technical standards, or, because of how the 
product is used, are they safety standards? Perhaps computer interoperability standards are safety 
standards as well when the computers in question are employed by air traffic controllers. Indeed, it 
would be difficult to conceive of a standard having absolutely no safety value in any situation. 
 177. See supra note 172. 
 178. The increased investigation necessary would certainly take more time and resources. See 
supra note 172. 
 179. Nothing would stop a quasi-legislative CARB from concluding that Unocal’s technology 
would be too expensive and writing the standard so as to avoid overlap. Unocal’s options would have 
been improved, but only if CARB had not undertaken the kind of comprehensive inquiry suggested 
here. Perhaps this indicates another solution to the problem: SDOs should not be given mandates to 
find the most cost-effective solution to a particular problem. Such solutions would never include 
patented technologies because of the probability of licensing fees. 
 180. This is well-illustrated by Unocal’s conduct before CARB. See supra Part II.A. 
 181. The case law supports the notion that no standards-setting body can escape antitrust scrutiny 
if it attempts to limit competition by restricting output or price. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Outside of these direct price restraints, the examination will be 
under the rule of reason. See discussion supra note 78. However, the faith that legislators and the 
enforcement bodies have placed in the SDO concept indicates that each believes strongly in its pro-
competitive effects. See supra note 43. 
 182. See generally Stoner, supra note 79; FTC Innovation Report, supra note 79. 
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that: a problem. The solution cannot be to rely increasingly upon such 
organizations and protect them from antitrust scrutiny;183 the solution is to 
allow, and to compel, competitors to compete.184
Matthew N. Kriegel*
 183. See supra notes 43–45. 
 184. The current rationale behind antitrust enforcement is that “freely operating competitive 
markets will result in the most efficient allocation of a nation’s scarce resources and will bring 
consumers the widest variety of choices and the lowest possible prices.” See Balto, supra note 8, at 15. 
A move back towards governmental standards-setting will by no means facilitate “freely operating 
competitive markets,” and is therefore in many respects an undesirable result for consumers. Id. The 
current trend of dis-incentivizing innovation, however, is worse still. 
 * A.B. (2001), Washington University; J.D. (2006), Washington University School of Law. 
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